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December 12 热狗的“差不多先生”生活中不可缺却又琐碎至极的他妈的差不多的情节 映射出了一首你我都会听进去的心灵缩影 只因我们都有著差不多的生活背景。 阿岳老了，歌词已经不“冲”了，怀念当年的秘密基地 热狗呢? 也7年了，热狗也从23岁到了现在他妈的孩子的爸，怀念他妈老子还读中学时的“九局下半” 我抽着差不多的的烟 又过了差不多的一天 一个差不多的台北市 有差不多的马子 差不多的夜生活 又喝着差不多的酒 差不多的挂 说着差不多抱怨的话 我是差不多先生 我的差不多是天生 差不多的反复 总是差不多又一无反顾 差不多的中国风 差不多要把耳朵蒙 我是差不多先生 我的差不多是天生 差不多的你 差不多的我 我唱了八十八个差不多 都差不多
November 03 A股股市最近周围人都在谈论抄底抄底，都在谈论A股是不是已经可以重新进入了。我至少认为不是，抛开一切基本面技术面不说，也抛开市场底部不能通过模型量化来说，但从人的心里出发，现在绝对不是底部。我还清晰记得，05年998点那次，第二天我同学陪我取开户，营业部那个人冷淡啊。另外一个朋友告诉我，当时他去开权证交易，客户经理竟然不知道要签风险协议书。
当股市跟国足一样遭人鄙夷的时候，当所有人（包括我自己在内）都忘记了自己的交易帐号的时候，当所有人都以为所谓人生就是在不景气的经济当中做一天和尚撞一天钟的时候，当所有人都不再知道什么叫做底部的时候，底部才算到了。
只要还有股评人士在发布预测说哪只股票未来几天一定涨涨涨，那么市场就远没有到底部。当股评人士的名誉降到和江湖郎中差不多，然后那些靠佣金维持的证券营业部开始倒闭时，真正的底部差不多才会到来。不要太底部，真正的底部只是一个数字，没有实际意义。如果作为长期投资，预期要一直持有到300%或500%利润目标才抛售的股票，贵10%或20%买进来差别并不大。
October 28 最近的生活对于最近的生活，只有四个字：妈的个逼！
从周围人听到的都是axing people, layoffs layoffs layoffs
So what's next?!
1. Hedge fund margin calls, redemptions and liquiadations.
2. Cov-lite loans default
3. Corporate CDO credit event, expecially on Synthetic ones - similar thing took place last year on subprime RMBS
4. hmmmmmmmmmmmm
和尚撞钟 October 16 Dr. Doom突然发现Baltic Dry Index最近2天内竟然跌了近20%。BDI作为全球贸易和未来经济生产的指标，中国在里面的成分占了很大。这样狂泄，暗示着中国，这个所谓的world's great industrial powerhouse，真他妈遇到了麻烦。我们对raw materials的进口真的在collapsing，collapsing的速度可能超乎我们的预期。
去他妈的2位数增长率吧。想想过去几年2位数的GDP growth rate给我们带来了什么？人民生活质量没怎么提高，倒是让股票市场和房地产市场提供了空前的繁荣，当然嘛全国人民都在给你们打工，喂饱了国内无数的白痴银行，也喂饱了无数的地产商们。
也许某些人，ok，可以控制物价，可以操纵GDP，甚至连人口我们都可以控制，带来所谓的繁荣的景象。但背后隐藏的种种体制上的危机，怎么能让我们放心前面就一定没有一个cap呢？某些制度下我们真的能，ok，不说2位数，以一个比较稳定的速度发展吗？XX必乱，如果继续这样下去的话，到时候倒霉的最终还是老百姓们。
呵呵，你能操纵Baltic Dry吗？ October 15 CPP的详细资料 - 来源于Treasury Department相信昨天为止，市场上没有人知道这个计划的详细内容，甚至根本不知道这个CPP (Capital Purchase Program)。就是前几天YY的政府直接往银行权益部分注入资本的猜想。Anyway，此内容来源于美国财政部。计划的详细内容在文中的黑体字部分。 BTW: 此计划是明智的，以前设立垃圾场收购银行垃圾资产减少银行负债的计划简直就是垃圾（Treasury据传让2房去收购垃圾资产去了）。
Treasury Announces TARP Capital Purchase Program Description
Washington- Treasury today announced a voluntary Capital Purchase Program to encourage U.S. financial institutions to build capital to increase the flow of financing to U.S. businesses and consumers and to support the U.S. economy. Under the program, Treasury will purchase up to $250 billion of senior preferred shares on standardized terms as described in the program's term sheet. The program will be available to qualifying U.S. controlled banks, savings associations, and certain bank and savings and loan holding companies engaged only in financial activities that elect to participate before 5:00 pm (EDT) on November 14, 2008. Treasury will determine eligibility and allocations for interested parties after consultation with the appropriate federal banking agency. The minimum subscription amount available to a participating institution is 1 percent of risk-weighted assets. The maximum subscription amount is the lesser of $25 billion or 3 percent of risk-weighted assets. Treasury will fund the senior preferred shares purchased under the program by year-end 2008. Institutions interested in participating in the program should contact their primary federal regulator for specific enrollment details. The senior preferred shares will qualify as Tier 1 capital and will rank senior to common stock and pari passu, which is at an equal level in the capital structure, with existing preferred shares, other than preferred shares which by their terms rank junior to any other existing preferred shares. The senior preferred shares will pay a cumulative dividend rate of 5 percent per annum for the first five years and will reset to a rate of 9 percent per annum after year five. The senior preferred shares will be non-voting, other than class voting rights on matters that could adversely affect the shares. The senior preferred shares will be callable at par after three years. Prior to the end of three years, the senior preferred may be redeemed with the proceeds from a qualifying equity offering of any Tier 1 perpetual preferred or common stock. Treasury may also transfer the senior preferred shares to a third party at any time. In conjunction with the purchase of senior preferred shares, Treasury will receive warrants to purchase common stock with an aggregate market price equal to 15 percent of the senior preferred investment. The exercise price on the warrants will be the market price of the participating institution's common stock at the time of issuance, calculated on a 20-trading day trailing average. Companies participating in the program must adopt the Treasury Department's standards for executive compensation and corporate governance, for the period during which Treasury holds equity issued under this program. These standards generally apply to the chief executive officer, chief financial officer, plus the next three most highly compensated executive officers. The financial institution must meet certain standards, including: (1) ensuring that incentive compensation for senior executives does not encourage unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the financial institution; (2) required clawback of any bonus or incentive compensation paid to a senior executive based on statements of earnings, gains or other criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate; (3) prohibition on the financial institution from making any golden parachute payment to a senior executive based on the Internal Revenue Code provision; and (4) agreement not to deduct for tax purposes executive compensation in excess of $500,000 for each senior executive. Treasury has issued interim final rules for these executive compensation standards. Nine large financial institutions already have agreed to participate in this program, moving quickly and collectively to signal the importance of the program for the system. These healthy institutions have voluntarily agreed to participate on the same terms that will be available to small and medium-sized banks and thrifts across the nation. October 14 YY对了！关于interbank lending的YY: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. will temporarily provide insurance for loans between banks, charging the banks a premium for doing so.
关于直接银行equity injections的YY: U.S. Treasury Said to Invest in Nine Major U.S. Banks.
对于deposit的担保计划也会出现吗？ October 13 YY美国政府最近可能要干什么危机还在持续高潮，估计下面政府可能有以下几个动作：1.对所有的银行存款进行临时的担保 2.对所有的银行之间的拆借进行担保 3.对银行直接进行资本注入，很有可能是优先股的形式，700 billion的皮包公司计划就像中药，太慢了，我们还是直接西药加开刀算了。
为什么猜测要对银行的存款进行担保呢？信用信用信用的问题，给存款人信心，防止银行因为run on导致因为liquidity原因破产。
为什么要对拆借也应该进行担保呢？还是信用信用信用的问题。看看他妈的Ted Spread和3个月的libor现在已经彪悍到什么程度了吧。Ted现在是4.63%，3mlibor现在4.8188%。仅仅一个月前才Ted1%左右。3mlibor仅仅笔同期的t-bills高0.75%左右(t-bills现在0.1826%，大家现在抢的欢啊)。政府必须对拆借进行担保，才能让银行之间恢复信心，避免同样因为liquidity的原因导致银行破产。还有一个更重要的问题就是很多按揭的证券都是以libor作为基准利率的，如果libor持续这么高（3月的比一个月前高了2%），那么更多的按揭贷款的违约就会进一部爆发，爆发后引发更多的CDS也爆发，后果自己可以想象。
为什么也应该对银行直接进行资本注入呢？其实这个才是银行问题的核心，现在他们资本是undercapitalized的，让皮包公司买他们的债务是可以降低他们的杠杆，但是这个东西要的时间太久了，恐怕还政府的皮包公司还没有进行交易，银行已经申请破产了。
所有问题的核心都是从不能让银行破产考虑的，经济的恢复必须靠银行的持续放贷才能进行，如果银行都跨了，我们还是取打酱油吧。
BTW:最近完全没有看懂美元的走势，按理说无论什么bail out计划都会导致大量的美元从印钞机里被印出来，美元应该因为预期大幅度贬值，可惜啊，最近美元在危机中一路高歌猛进，哎完全看不懂。
更看不懂的澳元，2个月前对美元还0.96左右，现在已经0.65了，澳大利亚到底出什么事情了? October 02 Shadow Valley Under the Darkness Darkness can affright me never; from Thy presence shadows flee. And if Thou wilt guide me ever, Jesus, I’ll go through with Thee. September 30 如果继续下去没有大动作美国经济会崩溃?!回答是肯定的 简单来说都是货币市场丧失流动性的原因
如果继续不通过 信心彻底丧失后 钱短期来看肯定是往最有流动性最没有风险的东西上面上跑
原来货币市场上给短期商业票据融资的资本肯定往短期国债上面跑
短期商业票据市场没有了资金供给 融资成本就会上升
由于制造企业都是通过票据市场来获得流动性资金 这样的话 僧多粥少 很多企业就算资产负债表结构很好 也会因为没有资金链断裂倒闭的
这样危机就完全跳出了华而街 影响到实体经济了 September 27 Credit Market完全崩溃 这周Lehman关于Credit Market的报告特别搞笑。下面是这报告的开头，嗯人家还是有职业道德的，公司被日了报告继续出，观点还做到了完全中立的，佩服佩服 To begin, we must acknowledge that there are certain credit market situations that we cannot discuss（请原谅我不能说我东家死掉了）. That said, we will endeavor to provide our thoughts on what has been a truly seminal period in the capital markets. With each passing week it is becoming increasingly difficult to come up with the words to describe the current events. In our view, what separates this week’s actions from those earlier in the year is the level of government interference in the price discovery process. Admittedly we are in unchartered territory for most of today’s market participants. First, let’s review what happened this week. The week began with extraordinary turnover in the broker sector. Bear Stearns’ demise in March left the market with only four major brokers. When Monday arrived, only two remained, with Merrill Lynch being absorbed by Bank of America（有职业道德啊，不是two remained吗，Merrill死了，hmmmmmm还有谁死了呢）. Equity markets hammered the last two and by Wednesday, Morgan Stanley CDS would be trading in points up front. That night it was broadly reported that the broker was in merger talks with Wachovia, the ailing super-regional bank. Like water in a desert, balance sheet is very scarce and very valuable. The Fed has increased its efforts to provide the market with balance sheet. On Monday the Fed expanded the PDCF and TSLF’s eligible collateral to include most common assets on banks’ balance sheets. In addition, a $70 billion shadow discount window was created. The market’s continued slide prompted the Fed to act again on Wednesday when it extended a 24-month credit line of up to $85 billion to AIG. In addition to the L+850 coupon for the loan, the government received an 79.9% stake in the insurer. The market’s decline continued throughout Wednesday leading to a coordinated effort by six central banks to add additional U.S. dollar liquidity to a dollar-scarce market. Interestingly, the one lever the Fed did not pull this week was monetary policy as the FOMC left rates unchanged. 最后来张照片，自己看吧 好的WaMu也死了 终于被其资产负债表上无数的option arm爆菊花了，不过早就改死了。现在没有想明白的是收购是否对CDS市场再次形成冲击，到底什么样的冲击。不过说实话credit market 3周前就已经完全崩溃了，流动性的完全丧失使得市场对本来天生就缺乏流动性的这些资产更难定价。不过有一点是肯定的，就是银行对其持有的各种loan的计价(marked-to-market)肯定是远远高于市场价格的。意味着什么？更多的write downs即将到来。 除非， 除非， 除非Paulson的SB 7000亿计划能被国会通过又没有怎么修改。Paulson真他妈牛X，打算让那个“大垃圾场”以hold-to-maturity的价格来收购不良资产。market value? Paulson说你给大爷闪，那些SB银行还没有了解到他们自己已经hosed的了，他们还没有理解到american banking system已经failed了。我这种做是拯救那些没有预料到自己下场的SB bankers们。 Wachovia， MBIA和AMBAC也应该快了。嗯说不定FDIC明年底因为地区银行破产也会爆掉的，嗯不错不错。 有钱人就买黄金吧，说不定2009年底会high上2000的。 T-Bills的Yiled这3周已经降到不可思益的底部了，资金现在是看到什么流动性高就往里面挤啊。 哎，市场乱，公司内部也乱，当和尚撞钟啦。不行就去非洲当投机倒把份子把，肯定赚爽的。 September 15 Fed会让AIG像LEH一样破产清算吗?简单的说答案是不会的, 因为和Bear被救一样, AIG和Bear都是CDS市场的writers, 它的规模甚至比Bear都还要大. 如果Fed都不会让Bear倒闭, AIG就更不可能了.
LEH被破产清算因为在CDS市场中, 它只是一个counterparty, 他的风险敞口其实是很小的, 如果破产清算, 和它做CDS的对方(无论对方是buy还是sell), 只需要把CDS终结了, 再找另外的人做counterparty就可以, 还可以收到collateral, 对市场的冲击没有Bear和AIG那样恐怖.
Fed很难让AIG倒闭的. 一个很怪的想法!现在美国股市Pre-Market关于LEH的trading肯定是sell大大超过了buy
说不定明天股市开市后因为卖的单子太多了直接崩溃了 然后给了LEH再次寻找买家的机会....... BOA疯了?实在想不通为什么BOA现在要买Merrill
Merrill现在股价是16.96，按照BOA的44个billions的出价，收购价格大概是29每股。抛开这个溢价就不说了，为什么不等一天呢？Lehman破产肯定会让明天Merrill的股价降得更低，说不定到10元左右呢，为什么就不等等呢？BOA到底再想什么？难道是因为除了Merrill外还有其他的bidder？
还有就是这次收购有意义吗？说不定会把BOA脱跨的。BOA本来连countrywide那次收购的不良资产就都还没有消化掉，现在又突然吞进这么多Merrill的垃圾资产，就不怕损失把自己也吞噬了？
再其次，就算他有能力吞进这些资产，如果WaMu，Wachovia或者AIG也像Lehman破产清算那样，不是把那些资产的市场价格弄得更低，BOA难道不会继续write downs？
这些风险它都考虑了？
BTW: Lehman的东西整理后会写写的 July 02 趋势？还是意外？ Given the severe censorship of online media here, I will write this post in english. It is all about an quite interesting phenomenon that I just found followed the "Weng An Riot" on last Saturday. While posts related to this riot have immediately been deleted by administrator of Tianya, Baidu and Sina, I just found that a post issued on Xinhua.net has been solely retained. Most threads and comments followed this post indicate that misbehaviors of Guizhou Government called forth sharp criticism, yet I really dont know why the webmaster didnt delete this post, and I also saw a similar post concerning a man from Beijing taking revenge on cops by killing 4 cops with a knife in Shanghai today. I have to say I am sort of happy to come across this "orphan post" since we are under severe censorship right now. And we know that Xinhua.net is pretty much like a official political amplifier of the Chinest Government. I dont know whether this is what we called "trend" or simply an accident. I hope it is the former one. June 07 最近关于市场的几个看法 关于投资分散化(diversification): 其实很多时候机构投资者在结构产品市场就是自己人忽悠自己人. 结构产品市场完全被保险公司, 养老基金和各式各样的高财务杠杆对冲基金所主宰. 这些机构们通过投资于各种CDO, 把资金分散到了各个领域. 但是它们忘记了大家都这样干其实根本就是投资没有被分散化. 他们其实根本就是被锁链锁在了一起.
关于信用违约互换(CDS)是否该有二级市场: 贝尔斯登所以被美联储bail-out, 主要的原因就是因为它是价值50万亿的CDS市场的主要参与者之一. 对于每一个CDS而言, 我们都需要一个金融机构在CDS的另外一侧(CDS Protection Seller). 那么CDS的这一侧有多少主要的参与机构呢? 答案是10个左右, 我们数都数得出来. 债券保险商们(FGIC, AMBAC and MBIA), 大的券商们(Morgan Stanley, Merril, USB and Bear etc)还要就是商业银行们. 如果贝尔斯登破产意味着什么? 意味着有5万亿的各类债券立刻失去了保护, 投资这些债券的人突然失去对冲信用风险的couterparty. 意味着整个CDS的网络突然失去了一个"连接器"进而恐慌情绪弥漫到整个市场, 让本来就难以确切定价的CDS产品顷刻间价值为0.我们不能否认，也不能想象如果贝尔斯登破产意味着什么可怕的后果（如果Fed不及时出面为市场提供流动性，下一个倒霉的就是Lehman），但是被政府bail-out难道不就是对所谓的Anglo-Saxon Economic Model的最大讽刺？难道这个不就是西方一直批判的裙带资本主义的典型例子？既然美联储陷入了两难的境地，为什么不让信用违约互换市场有二级市场呢？不要告诉我建立这个市场的成本很大；不要告诉我信用违约互换的内在结构复杂；不要告诉我如何定义信用违约存在着十分大的争议。抛开这一切，是的我承认如果真的要做到对信用违约互换交易绝对需要对现有的规章作出一定的修改。但是既然我们能对无数的衍生产品和期货和约设立二级市场，我实在想不出理由为什么相同的事情不能发生在这个产品上。 关于债券保险商们(monolines): 这类型的金融机构们简直是没救了。最有名的MBIA和AMBAC今年年初就发生了信用危机。虽然二者今年年初通过在市场重新融资勉强保住了三大评级机构对其Aaa/AAA/AAA的评级。但是整整半年了，市场整整给了他们半年的时间来给他们做出调整的机会。或许他们根本早就注定了死亡。总之这半年他们给市场的回应是什么？不断爆出的损失；公司的高层不断抱怨着投资者们的短视；随着市场对他们失去了信心，Fitch和S&P终于将二者作出了降级的处理，并申明继续降级的可能。我相信Moody的降级也是迟早的。总之一切都是应得的。不给投资者们展示出一种愿意采取一切措施的态度，而是不断抱怨投资者们，呵呵......... May 26 什么时候是低谷？ OFHEO (Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight)刚刚发布了2008年第一季度美国个人住房房价的平均指数。 2008年第一季度美国个人住房房价继续下跌，而且是加速的下跌，远远超过了2007年第三季度和第四季度1.4%的下跌速度。加速的下跌意味着什么？ 这里抛开一切关于银行和金融机构的利益不谈，让我们只关注普通购房者的利益。首先说明的是在美国很多人都是通过housing market来套利的。参考另外一个著名的房价指数Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, 利用Excel作图会发现美国的10大城市的房价从1997年上半年到2007年上半年一直是一种上升的趋势。整整10年啊！房价上升的比率是整整281%！这意味着什么？意味着如果你投资买一座房子，每年会给你提供11.2%的回报率。这是一个多么诱人的回报啊，远远超过了一切high-yiled bonds的受益，风险却比垃圾债券要低。 面对如此巨大的回报，收入较高的人们通过home equity loan，second lien mortgage甚至third lien疯狂地重新融资买入第二套，第三套住房。收入较低甚至没有收入的人们则通过subprime和alt-a mortgage来购买他们的第一套新房。如此一来，美国全民的购房热情为经济危机埋下了伏笔。 当个人住房房价去年开始下跌后，首先出现违约上升的便是次级贷款(subprime)。也就是所说的次贷危机。但是为什么连优级贷款到现在也出现了大量的违约呢？这里要提到一下LTV(Loan-To-Value)，住房贷款总额与房屋价格的比率。LTV一般的比率对于优级是在80%以下，要求购房者首付20%。现在美国房价持续下跌，在很多州住房的市场价格已经低于了贷款的总额。举个简单例子，如果一套100万的房子贷款是80万，由于房屋价格持续下跌，使房屋的价格低于了80万，那么在这个情况下，如果贷款人拥有多套住房，那么就算贷款人现在还有能力偿还贷款，他也会自愿的放弃偿还导致违约的发生。 这就是为什么现在无论次级和优级贷款都发生大量违约的原因。回到上面的OFHEO的报告，第一季度房价加速下跌就意味着更多的贷款将发生违约现象，从而将导致资产证券化产品的投资者损失更大。 关于个人住房贷款的一切报告与数据都显示市场在持续恶化。美国银行对收购countrywide的保留意见；Fannie Mae竟然沦落为净资本为负的状况，如果不是美国政府背景，它也许早就类似于贝尔斯登被bail-out。那么什么时候是最低谷？还是那句话，没有人知道。不过现在不景气的状况持续到2009年下旬是不容置疑的。 BTW: Case-Shiller最新一期的指数也将在美国时间本周四（中国时间周五）放出。考虑到其指数包含了OFHEO没有的成分，Case-Shiller的下降程度将比OFHEO更大，我们初步估计year-over-year的下跌将接近15%. May 14 Regarding Work - Part 2 Just take a look at people around you in their twenties. They are changing jobs over and over. They wish to join start-up tech campanies and become multimillionaires or even billionaires literally overnight!!!! They wish to be a member of buy-out firms to take over BIG BIG BIG companies right away!!!!
The old idea of having to work long and hard for success was wiped out by an brand-new "I want it all right here and right now" attitude. This trend is being cemented into our soul by super atheletes and pop-song stars who make huge amounts of money and some are only in their teens.
The media distorted the reality so that people who have to struggle or work desperately to be successful are left with a strange feeling that somehow, they are being left out. And they feel that the world owes them something. In real life it does not work that way. There are no guarantees that anyone will be rich and successful. Nobody owes you anything! You need to get down to earth and realize that you have to pave your own way to success by working hard and being deligent. There is no other way.
Sure, luck plays some part in the scheme of things. No doubt, but you can not control luck. All you can do is to look at what you have going for you, and maximize it. Ignore what you are lack of. If you focus on your negative, it is all over for you. And luck will not have a chance to enter into your life. It is very important to know what you want for yoruself, not what other people want for you. Make your own decisions on what is best for yourself. May 08 Regarding Work - Part 1 To do something really well you have to love it. But it is not easy. Most people grow up being taught that work is not fun. Parents, teachers and even friends around you want you to work hard in school. And the rest of the time, you can have fun doing what you want. Playing Starcraft or Counter-Strike is fun, going to school is not fun. Then as a young adult you have to pick a profession. Most of us are unprepared. We can not imagine how work can be fun cuz we have been conditioned to think otherwise.
So we are lured into jobs that our parents favor; jobs that lead to an automatic paycheck and a high level of prestige. Whether we actually like it is irrelevant and does not figure into the decision. Prestige and money are a dangerous seduction for a young person making a career decision. Many young people gravitate toward careers that will impress other people. Their decisions are fatally flawed by the fact that the people they are trying to impress are not really discriminating.
- to be continued April 11 为什么金融危机没有造成美国股市的全面下跌 从去年8月到目前为止, 与固定收益市场缩水了30%的幅度相比, 美国股票市场却神奇地只下跌了15%左右. 今年第一季度报告显示, 除bear stern外, 其他4大投行的表现均大大超出了金融行业分析员们的悲观预测. 各卖方机构的equity部门均显示了超出分析师预测的盈利. 那到底是什么让股票市场的表现在目前的表现来看的还是如此的decent呢? 我们都知道股票的理论价格是市场对其公司未来现金流贴现的加总. 理论上, 在目前信贷紧缩的情况下, 大企业们很难通过较低的债务融资成本借到钱来满足公司短期的运营, 这样的话美国的股市就会收到信贷市场的拖累而大幅下跌. 但从美国股市的表现说明了目前来看, 投资人对大公司的现金流没有顾虑. 那这个到底是什么原因呢? 一般来说, 企业总是当一笔借款到期后, 通过重新借款的方法再次融资. 可能是因为目前来看, 这些借款还没有到期, 公司们还没有进行再次的债务融资罢了. 我们都知道对于一个公司来说, 其债务融资的周期一般在2-5年左右(不考虑商业票据市场). 如果到那个时候信贷市场的环境还是没有改变, 那么这些公司就会陷入严重的债务融资危机中, 到时候美国股市一定会大跌的. 我相信大公司的CFO们都知道他们面临着这个问题, 但是信贷市场危机的波及性是滞后效应的. 至少在目前的情况下, 企业的债务融资周期还没有到, 或者就算到了, 他们也可以通过一些其他"特殊"的方式挺一段时间. 但是如果信贷市场的状况迟迟无法改善的话(短期来看要是完全恢复我把我的电脑吃了), 这些大公司的股价就会下跌. 美国股市也将陷入到目前的金融危机中. 所以目前的关键的是信贷市场何时能恢复信心. 至于这个问题........... 没有人能知道确切答案....... 只有god知道. April 10 现在其实是机构投资者投资固定收益产品的最佳时机目前全球来看, credit产品的内在真实价值和实际交易价格已经完全脱离, 有的的ABS产品价格甚至以discount到面值的10%在交易. 虽然现在全球谈"信贷"色变, 但是本人认为目前信贷危机的状况,其实给不受流动性限制的投资者提供了诱人的投资机会, 就是平时俗话说的抄底机会. 如果在此时, 有机构投资者有大量的资金, 不受流动性的限制, 以低价买入以上2中情况下被迫变卖的产品(当然要经过成熟的定量和定性分析), 等待市场回暖, 信用恢复时一定能创造出客观的回报. March 26 Bear Stearn背后被扒光衣服的的"价值投资者"们 北美第五大的broker, 抵押债券市场仅次于Lehman的抵押债券承销商,就这样洪然倒下了. 被强奸的最惨的是出名的billionare Joseph Lewis. 此人以平均108美元左右的价格陆续买进了Bear Stern约8%的股票. 与他"背背山"的是前CEO Jamie Dimon. 当然其实2人并不孤独, 排在他们后面的是一大群以"价值投资"为理念的机构投资者们. Barrow, Hanley和Mewhinney & Strauss是Bear最大的机构投资者. 三机构目前管理的资产是50个billion, 持有的Bear 11,485,058的股票. 如果按照bear流动性危机爆发前的30美元一股计算, 它们在第一季度共损失了大约500个million. 当然此数字还没有考虑在同样的头寸上已经损失的300个million. 如果说上面三个机构投资者还比较陌生的话, bear 5-10的股东名字就是赫赫有名了. State Street, Barclays Global Investor, Vanguard, Janus Cap, Fidelity and Putnam. 最幸运的是Janus, 去年年底卖出了大部分持有的股票. Putnam卖出了一部分, 但是bear的仓位依然不小. 对于BGI和Fidelity这样的庞然大物来说, 其持有的头寸损失似乎只是皮毛, 对于其一季度的收益影响应该不大. 一些brokers和assets management firm也受到了影响. 除Lehman其下的资产管理公司Neuberger Berman, UBS AG和Morgan Stanley的资产管理部也遭受了重创. 排在最后的是另外一个共同基金巨人T. Rowe Price, 持有1,386,765股, 不过人家也是巨型共同基金. 最惨的是Barrow, Hanley和Mewhinney & Strauss, 仅仅因为bear的危机就已经损失了2%的资金的他们能否度过这个难关还是未知数. 因为他们的投资者基本都是机构投资者, 对于fund of fund来说, 如此大的损失是难以接受的. bearn stern的collapse, countrywide被 u.s. bank收购, god在这个市场里似乎玩得很开心.......... |
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